Saturday, May 31, 2014

00 - Table of Contents


00b - Author's Introduction

Introduction

  • purpose: improve vocab. for talking about judg’ts & choices of others, the company’s new policies, a colleague’s investment decisions. — distinctive patterns in the errors people make, systematic errors, biases
  • the mental work that produces impressions, intuitions, & many decisions is unconsc.
  • most of our judg’ts & actions are appropr. most of the time — but not always
  • Aim: improve ability to identify, underst. errors of judg’t & choice — in others, eventually in selves, provide richer, more precise lang. to discuss them

Origins

  • current underst. of judg’t & decision making ß psychological discoveries of recent decades
  • collaboration w. the late Amos Tversky, many years


Where We Are Now

  • to present a view of how the mind works that draws on recent devep’ts in cognitive & social psych’y —we now underst. intuitive thought, its marvels & flaws
  • one kind of valid intuition ß experts have learned to recog. familiar elements in a new situation, act approp’ly — good intuitive judg’ts come to mind immed’ly — w. relevant expertise, recog. situation, intuitive sol’n likely correct — intuition may also work when difficult question & skilled sol’n available
  • emotion very impt. in intuitive judg’ts & choices
  • the essence of intuitive heuristics: faced w. a difficult question, we often answ. an easier question instead, usually without noticing
  • spontaneous search for intuitive sol’n sometimes fails —no expert sol’n & no heuristic answ. comes to mind — then may switch to a slower, more deliberate, effortful form of thinking, i.e. “Slow Thinking
  • “Fast Thinking” incl. both variants of intuitive thought, the expert & the heuristic, also auto. perception & memory

What Comes Next

·         Part 1. Two Systems :  basic elements of two-systems approach to judg’t & choice — elaborates distinction of auto. operations of System 1 vs. controlled operations of System 2, shows how associative memory ( the core of S1) continually constructs a coherent interpr’n of what is going on in our world at any instant — the complexity & richness of the auto. & often unconscious processes that underlie intuitive thinking, how they explain the heuristics of judg’t — a goal is to introduce a language for thinking & talking about the mind
·         Part 2. Heuristics and Biases: updates the study of judg’t heuristics — asks: Why is it so difficult for us to think statistically?  — we easily think associatively, metaphorically, causally — but statistics req. thinking about many things at once — S1 is not designed for that
·         Part 3. Overconfidence: our excessive confid. in what we believe we know, inability to acknowl. our ignorance & uncertainty of the world we live in —illustr. by difficulties of statistical thinking —prone to overestimate how much we underst. the world, underest. the role of chance — overconfid. increased by certaintyof hindsight (illusory)
·         I hope for watercooler conversations that intelligently explore the lessons that can be learned fr. the past while resisting the lure of hindsight & the illusion of certainty
·         Part 4. Choices: in economics, the nature of decision making,  & assumpt’n that econ. agents are rational —using the two-system model, the key concepts of prospect theory (our model of choice, Amos & I, pub’d 1979) — subseq. chapters: ways human choices deviate fr. rationality, tendency to treat problems in isolation, & w. framing effects, decisions shaped by inconsequential features of choice problems — a deep challenge to the rationality assumption favored in standard economics
·         Part 5. Two Selves: disting. experiencing self vs. remembering self, hv diff. interests — e.g. expose people to 2 painful exper’s, one worse, i.e. longer, but we can exploit the auto. formation of memories (a feature of S1) so that worse episode leaves better memory; when people later choose which episode to repeat, they are guided by their rememb. self, expose selves to unnecess. pain —2 selves theory applied to measurement of wellbeing, what makes the experiencing self happy is diff. fr. remembering self — difficult question: How can two selves within a single body pursue happiness?  for individuals, for societies that view well-being of pop’n as policy objective
·         Concluding chapter: in reverse order, implications of three distinctions drawn in the book: (1) experiencing vs. remembering selves, (2) conception of agents in classical economics vs. in behavioral economics (which borrows fr. Psych’y), (3) auto. System 1 vs. effortful System 2 — then, the virtues of educating gossip, how organizations can improve the quality of judg’ts & decisions made on their behalf

·         Appendixes: 2 articles author wrote w. Amos —review of judg’t under uncertainty — prospect theory, studies of framing effects — cited by the Nobel committee—suprisingly simple —will give you a sense of how much we knew long ago, also how much learned in recent decades

01 - Chapter 1: The Characters of the Story

Part 1: Two Systems


Chapter 1: The Characters of the Story

System 1

  • S1 operates auto’ly, quickly, little or no effort, involuntary — e.g. see pict. of angry woman, know inst’ly her mood, anticip. her likely to say next
·         e.g.:
o   detect that one object is more distant than another
o   orient to source of sudden sound
o   complete the phrase “bread and…”
o   make a “disgust face” when shown horrible picture
o   detect hostility in a voice
o   answ. to 2 + 2 = ?
o   read words on large billboards
o   drive car on empty road
o   find strong move in chess (if you are a chess master)
o   underst. simple sentences
o   recog. that a “meek & tidy soul w. a passion for detail” resembles an occupa’l stereotype
  • S1 incl. innate skills we share w. other animals —  e.g. recog. objects, orient attention, avoid losses
  • S1 incl. mental activities that become fast & auto. thru prolonged practice — assoc’ns between ideas, learned skills such as reading & underst. nuances of social situations — also expert skills, e.g. chess intuition
  • S1 often completely voluntary — but some can be partially controlled, e.g. chewing

System 2

  • S2 is effortful,  attention req. allocation (“pay attention”) — often assoc’d w. feeling of agency, choice, concentr’n — the conscious, reasoning self, has beliefs, makes choices, decides what to think about & what to do —e.g. multiply 17 x 24
·         e.g.:
o   brace for starter gun in a race
o   focus on voice of a particular person in a crowded, noisy room
o   look for woman w. white hair
o   search memory, identify a surprising sound
o   maintain a faster walking speed than is natural for you
o   monitor appropriateness of your behavior in a social situation
o   count the occurrences of letter ‘a’ in a page of text
o   tell someone your phone number
o   park in narrow space
o   compare two washing machines for overall value
o   fill out tax form
o   check validity of complex logical argu’t
  • all S2 operations req. attention, disrupted when attention is withdrawn —effortful activities interfere w. each other, difficult to do several S2 things at once, unless very easy activities — Invisible Gorilla experiment: focused attention à blind to the obvious; also, blind to own  blindness

Plot Synopsis (Organization of the book)

  • impt. theme: interaction of S1 & S2
  • both S1 & S2 are active whenever we are awake — S1 runs auto’ly, S2 normally in low-effort mode, using only fraction of its capacity
  • S1 contin’ly generates suggest’ns for S2: impressions, intuitions, intentions, feelings — if endorsed by S2, impressions & intuitions turn into beliefs, impulses turn into voluntary actions — usually S2 adopts the suggestions of  S1 w. little or no modification — usually this is efficient (we gen’ly  believe our impressions, act on our desires) — but not always
  • S2 activates when S1 does not have an answ. — S2 activated for event wh. violates S1’s model of the world — e.g. a surprise event activates & orients your attention: you stare, search your memory for a story that makes sense of the event
  • S2 also monitors our own behavior (e.g. stay polite when angry, alert for danger)
  • S2 mobilized when error is about to be made — e.g. think of when almost blurted out something, hard to control
  • Summary: most of what you (your System 2) think & do originates in your System 1, but System 2 takes over when things get difficult, S2 normally has the last word. 

  • S1 & S2 usually work well together — however, S1 has biases, leading to systematic errors in specified circumstances — e.g. S1 sometimes answ’s easier q. than the one it was asked, S1  little underst. of logic & statistics
  • also, S1 cannot be turned off

Conflict

·         this test engages S2:

Your first task is to go down both columns, calling out whether each word is printed in lowercase or in uppercase. When you are done with the first task, go down both columns again, saying whether each word is printed to the left or to the right of center by saying (or whispering to yourself) "LEFT" or "RIGHT."
LEFT                                         upper
left                                            lower
right                                         LOWER
RIGHT                                    upper
RIGHT                                    UPPER
left                                           lower
LEFT                                       LOWER
right                                        upper

  • conflict between auto. reaction & intention to control — S2 overcoming the impulses of S1 — i.e. S2 is in charge of self-control

Illusions

  • Müller-Lyer illusion  — S1 “sees” lines are unequal, error — measuring (S2) shows they are equal
  • e.g. cognitive illusion: psychotherapist feels strong sympathy for patient w. repeated treatment failures (psychopathic charm)
  • N.B. cognitive illusions v. difficult to overcome — S1 automatic, cannot be turned off at will — S2 may have no clue to biases of S1 — cannot be contin’ly vigilant
  • the best we can do, compromise: learn to recog. situations in which mistakes are likely, try harder to avoid signif. mistakes when the stakes are high
  • N.B. it is easier to recog. other people’s mistakes than our own

Useful Fictions

  • S1 & S2 are only personifications, useful fictions

Speaking of System 1 & System 2

·         “He had an impression, but some of his impressions are illusions.”
·         “This was a pure System 1 response. She reacted to the threat before she recognized it.”

·         “This is your System 1 talking. Slow down & let your System 2 take control.”

02 - Chapter 2: Attention & Effort

Chapter 2: Attention & Effort

  • S2 is lazy, usually guided by S1 — but S2 has vital tasks

Mental Effort

  • e.g. strenuous exer. for S2, Add-1 = first, think of strings of 4 digits, all different, write each string on an index card. Place a blank card on top of stack. Add-1, beat steady rhythm (or use metronome, 1/sec). Remove the blank card, read the four digits aloud. Wait for two beats, then report a string w. each of the original digits incremented by 1 — (e.g. if the digits on the card are 5294, report 6305) — impt. to keep rhythm — even more difficult, Add-3.
  • pupil dilation = mental effort — window to the soul — cognitive pupillometry
  • mental life (S2) normally low level, relaxed — occasionally speeded up, even less often makes big effort
  • Difficult mental task àblindness — e.g. Invisible Gorilla experiment — S2 allocates attention  to most impt. task, leftover for other tasks, on sec.-by-sec. basis— in an emergency S1 has full control
  • more skill involves less effort — “law of least effort,”  least demanding course of action
  • What makes some cognitive operat’ns more demanding & effortful than others? What req. increased attention? What can S2 do that S1 cannot?
  • effort is required to keep 2 ideas in mind at same time, each requiring separate actions, or to combine the two (S2)
  • S2 is the only one that can follow rules, compare objects on several attributes, make deliberate choices between options
  • S1 detects simple relations (“they are all alike,” “son is much taller than father”), easily integrates information about one thing — but S1 does not deal w. multiple distinct topics at once — S1 not good w. purely statistical information
  • S2 impt. capability: adopt “task sets,” i.e. program memory w. an instr’n overriding habitual responses — e.g. count all occurrence of letter f on page — “executive control” = adopt & terminate task sets — effort is increased when switching tasks, also by time pressure

Speaking of Attention & Effort

·         “I won’t try to solve this while driving. This is a pupil-dilating task. It requires mental effort!”
·         “The law of least effort is operating here. He will think as little as possible.”
·         “She did not forget about the meeting. She was completely focused on something else when the meeting was set and she just didn’t hear you.”

·         “What came quickly to my mind was an intuition from System 1. I’ll have to start over and search my memory deliberately.”

03 - Chapter 3: The Lazy Controller

Chapter 3: The Lazy Controller


  • S2 has a natural speed — while monitoring envir’t, random thoughts, minor decisions
  • self-control is req’d for coherent or effortful thinking, fighting inherent laziness (“law of least effort”)
  • sometimes cognitive thinking achieves flow = “state of effortless concentr’n so deep that we lose sense of time, of self, of personal problems” — in a state of flow, no sf-control req’d to maintain focused attention on intense activities, resource of sf-control are freed to be directed to task at hand

The Busy & Depleted System 2

  • sf-control (S2) takes mental effort, so when cognitive effort (S2) is high, sf-control is reduced — e.g. when cogn’ly busy, more prone to give in to tempt’n, to S1 choices, selfish choices, sexist lang., superf’l social judg’ts
  • S2 controls thought & behaviour
  • a shared pool of mental energy, all voluntary effort (cognitive, emotional, physical) draws at least partly on it — any effort of will or self-control is tiring, reduces sf-control —lost motivation, after sf-control in one task, not feel like making an effort in another —called ego depletion — not just a metaphor, consumption of glucose; can restore sf-control by taking glucose — e.g. Israeli judges grant parole more often soon after food breaks
  • e.g. activities that deplete self-control — try not think of white bears, stop emotional response to a stirring film, make series of choices involving conflict, try impress others, respond kindly to  partner’s bad behavior, interact w. a person of a different race (for prejudiced indiv’ls)
  • e.g. indications of depletion —deviate fr. one’s diet, overspend on impulsive purchases, react  aggress’ly to provoc’n, persist less time in handgrip,  perform poorly in cogn. tasks & logical decision making

The Lazy System 2

  • S2 monitors & controls suggestions of S1 — e.g. puzzle: A bat & ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? — intuition (S1) suggests easy, incorrect answer, 10 cents — failure to check answ. w. simple math task, failure to think of social cue, Why asked such an “obvious” question?
  • e.g. syllogism: All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade quickly. Therefore some roses fade quickly. — seems intuit’ly valid, but it’s invalid, checking the logic req. S2 — concl’n: if believe a conclusion is true àbelieve argu’ts that seem to support it, even invalid ones —  for S1, concl’n comes first, argu’ts follow
  • e. g. the Michigan/Detroit problem — How many murders occur in the state of Michigan in one year? — answ. depends on memory that Detroit (high crime) is in Michigan, retrieved more quickly in some people, but can be found w. an S2 search of memory
  • these 3 examples show S2 is lazy, accepts easy S1 responses — people less prone to these errors are more intellect’ly engaged, “rational”

Intelligence, Control, Rationality

  • sf-control is a measure of intelligence

Speaking of Control

·         “She did not have to struggle to stay on task for hours. She was in a state of flow.”
·         “His ego was depleted after a long day of meetings. So he just turned to standard operating procedures instead of thinking through the problem.”
·         “He didn’t bother to check whether what he said made sense. Does he usually have a lazy System 2 or was he unusually tired?”

·         “Unfortunately, she tends to say the first thing that comes into her mind. She probably also has trouble delaying gratification. Weak System 2.”

04 - Chapter 4: The Associative Machine

Chapter 4: The Associative Machine


  • the surprising workings of S1 — e.g. consider the words “Bananas Vomit” — S1 assumes the words are connected, temporally, causally à slight nausea, some phys’l responses,  altered memory ( i.e. more responsive to assoc’d words), sense of surprise
  • associative activation — responses are instantaneous, involuntary
  • N.B. this complex of responses is coherent — a self-reinforcing pattern of cognitive, emotional, & phys’l responses that is both diverse & integrated, associatively coherent
  • starting fr. completely unexpected event (2 simple words, oddly juxtaposed),
    • S1 tried to make sense, linked words in causal story;
    • evaluated possible threat (mild to moderate);
    • created context for future develop’ts, preparing for events suddenly now more likely;
    • also created a context for the current event, evaluating how surprising it was
  • note that for S1 mere conjunction of 2 words rep’d reality, hence body reacted as mild reaction to real thing, also emotional response & phys’l recoil included — cognition is embodied, i.e.you think w. your body, not only brain
  • assoc’n of ideas, associative memory —much happens at once, an idea is activated, activates many ideas, they activate others, often unconscious
  • we have limited access to the workings of our minds

The Marvels of Priming

  • priming effect — once exposed to one word, more ready to detect assoc’d words — then the primed idea can prime more ideas, altho more weakly, ripple effect
  • priming can be result of event (not just words, ideas), we may not be aware — e.g. “the Florida effect,” students in Fla. primed w. words suggesting old age afterwards walked more slowly, i.e. word primed idea of old age, wh. then primes behaviour; no awareness — the ideomotor effect, an idea primes an action — reciprocal priming, walking abnormally slowly primes ideas of old age — nodding head primes for positive response, shaking head for negative

Primes that Guide Us

  • priming shows we are not as autonomous as we think
  • e.g. voting affected by location of polling booth, booth in school increases support for educ’n — priming w. reminders of money à more independent, persistent, selfish, less social, i.e. individ’ism —images of Big Brother à less independent thinking — reminders of mortality à more open to authoritarian ideas — shame àinclination to think of & buy soap (the “Lady Macbeth” effect)


  • e.g. image placed in front of coffee machine, how many people pay for their coffee?
  • conscious self does not want to believe in power of priming, but it is true
  • S1 is the “stranger in you” — largely unknown, but in control of much of what you do — S1 give impressions à beliefs — S1 impulses à choices, actions — S1 interprets what happens to you & around you, linking the present w. the recent past & w. expect’ns abt the near future — S1 contains the model of the world that instantly evaluates events as normal or surprising —source of your rapid & often precise intuitive judg’ts —does most of this without conscious awareness of its activities
  • S1 is also the origin of many of the systematic errors in our intuitions

Speaking of Priming

·         “The sight of all these people in uniforms does not prime creativity.”
·         “The world makes much less sense than you think. The coherence comes mostly from the way your mind works.”
·         “They were primed to find flaws, and this is exactly what they found.”
·         “His System 1 constructed a story, and his System 2 believed it. It happens to allel

·         “I made myself smile and I’m actually feeling better!”

05 - Chapter 5: Cognitive Ease

Chapter 5: Cognitive Ease


  • mind is always active to maintain & update certain q’s — e.g. Is anything new going on? A threat? Things going well? Shd attention be redirected? Task req. more effort? — these assessments determine (among other things) whether extra effort is req’d fr. S2

the mind constantly measures cognitive ease, i.e. how well things are doing, whether extra effort fr. S2 is needed — cognitive strain
  • e.g. sentence printed in clear font, or repeated, or primed, is processed w. cogn. ease — hear speaker when you are in a good mood (or even when pencil stuck crosswise in your mouth to make you “smile”) induces cogn. ease — converse also true for cogn. strain
  • causes of ease or strain have interchangeable effects — when at cogn. ease, mood is good, like what you see, believe what you hear, trust intuitions, current situ’n feels comfortably familiar — also thinking likely to be rather casual & superficial — when strained, more vigilant & suspicious, more effortful, less comfortable, make fewer errors — but also less intuitive, less creative

Illusions of Remembering

  • illusion of familiarity — e.g. shown fictitious names, days later given list of names, asked to pick out minor celebrities, will include the fictitious names — sense of familiarity for minor items ß sense of ‘pastness,’ an illusion, only because you recog. the word more easily — cognitive ease of S1 (see illustration above) — illusion ß not aware of why cogn’ly easy

Illusions of Truth

  • some illusions are predictable when judg’t based on sense of cognitive ease or strain  (see illustration above) — beliefs biased by anything that makes it easier for associative machine to run smoothly — freq. repetition à false beliefs, familiarity is confused w. truth

How to Write a Persuasive Message

  • reduce cogn. strain — e.g. print w. max contrast betw characters & background, strong colours, high quality paper, simple lang. — memorable ß rhyme, rhythm — if quoting a source, source’s name easy to pronounce
  • know a statement is true ß strongly linked by logic or assoc’n to pre-existing beliefs or pref’s, comes fr. trusted source — i.e. sense of cogn. ease — BUT cogn. ease can have many sources, we are not always aware of which
  • sense of ease or strain has multiple causes, hard to separate them —but not impossible, req’s strong motiv’n to overcome superf’l factors that produce illusions of truth  
  • usually lazy S2 adopts the suggestions of S1

Strain & Effort

·         symmetry: S2 ßà cogn. strain — i.e. cogn. strain mobilizes S2
·         e.g. puzzle w. obvious but wrong answ. dupes people less when printed in small font, strain awakens S2

The Pleasure of Cognitive Ease

  • cogn. ease of S1 gives good feelings — e.g. IPOs more successful for companies w. easy to pronounce names — the mere exposure effect:  repeating unknown word increases good feelings about it, even unconscious (word shown rapidly) — biology, repeated stimulus, learn no bad consequences

Ease, Mood, & Intuition

  • tests of creativity
  • these go together: good mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, increased reliance on S1
  • these go together: sadness, vigilance, suspicion, an analytic approach, increased effort
  • happy mood loosens the control of S2 over performance, more intuitive & creative, but less vigilant, more prone to logical errors
  • good mood = things gen’ly going well, environ’t is safe, OK to let guard down
  • bad mood = things not going very well, may be a threat, vigilance is req’d

Speaking of Cognitive Ease

·         “Let’s not dismiss their business plan just because the font makes it hard to read.”
·         “We must be inclined to believe it because it has been repeated so often, but let’s think it through again.”
·         “Familiarity breeds liking. This is a mere exposure effect.”

·         “I’m in a very good mood today, and my System 2 is weaker than usual. I should be extra careful.”

06 - Chapter 6: Norms, Surprises, & Causes

Chapter 6: Norms, Surprises, & Causes

 in sum:
    • our mind can rep. the structure of the world by associative links —vast networkof various types of ideas — the spreading activation in assoc. machine is auto’
    • but we (S2) can control to search memory, & program memory to look for & direct attnetion to certain items in the environ’t

Assessing Normality

  • main function of S1 is to maintain & update a model of your personal world — model rep’s what is normal in it — made of assoc’ns linking ideas of circumst’s, events, actions, outcomes that occur together  w. some regularity, occur together or near in time — links form, strengthen à rep’n of structure of events in your life, determines your interp’n of present & expect’ns of future.
  • Surpise is v. impt.
  • 2 kinds of expect’n:  (a) active, conscious (e.g. waiting for event),  (b) passive expect’n, not waiting but not surprised, normal event
  • just one event can alter what seems normal — “How many animals of each kind did Moses take into the ark?” Biblical context makes name Moses (wrong) seem normal
  • detect’n of abnormality is v. fast — even when req’ing much knowl., e.g. upper-class voice says, “I have a large tattoo on my back”
  • norms, share w. others to enable communic’n
  • S1 accesses norms of categories, knows range of plausible values, most typical cases

Seeing Causes and Intentions

  • S1 sorts out causes, constructs coherent story — e.g. “Fred’s parents arrived late. The caterers were expected soon. Fred was angry.”
  • S1’s story can be erroneous — e.g. day Saddam captured, Bloomberg News service first headline: U.S. Treasuries Rise; Hussein Capture May Not Curb Terrorism, 30 min. later bond prices fell, headline: U.S. Treasuries Fall; Hussein Capture Boosts Allure Of Risky Assets
  • e.g. “After spending a day exploring beautiful sights in the crowded streets of New York, Jane discovered that her wallet was missing.” à stronger assoc. w. word ‘pickpocket’ than word ‘sights’ — S1 constructs story
  • we (S1) perceive causality (cf. Kant, the mind imposes causality on our perceptions) — e.g. film of shapes “pushing” each other, chasing, cowering, i.e. physical causality, also intentional causality
  • source of religion here? S1 separating physical & intentional causality à disembodied self, mind, soul
  • N.B. intuition of causality very impt. à often apply causal think wrongly, esp. when statistics is appropr.— S1 not statistical (S2 can be trained to think statistically)

Speaking of Norms & Causes

·         “When the second applicant also turned out to be an old friend of mine, I wasn’t quite as surprised. Very little repetition is needed for a new experience to feel normal!”
·         “When we survey the reaction to these products, let’s make sure we don’t focus exclusively on the average. We should consider the entire range of normal reactions.”

·         “She can’t accept that she was just unlucky; she needs a causal story. She will end up thinking that someone intentionally sabotaged her work.”

07 - Chapter 7: A Machine for Jumping to Conclusions

Chapter 7: A Machine for Jumping to Conclusions


  • S1 jumps to conclusions —efficient if the concl’s are probably correct, of costs of occasional error acceptable, if jump saves time & effort —but risky in unfamiliar situ’n,  when stakes high, when no time to collect moreinfo — then intuitive errors are likely —preventable by a deliberate intervention of S2

Neglect of Ambiguity & Suppression of Doubt

  •  
     same middle terms in l. & r. boxes, but we perceive l. as B and r. as 13 because of context —middle box, we think of bank as $, not river bank — S1 generated context, fr. most common experience
  • we were unaware of the ambiguity, not aware of any alternatives — S1 does not have consc. doubt
  • S2 accepts uncertainy, doubt

A Bias to Believe and Confirm

  • S1 is biased to believe, gullible — in order to underst. a state’t, must first grasp meaning, think of it as true
  • S2 in charge of doubting, unbelieving
  • when S2 is busy, tired, lazy à believe
  • confirmation bias — e.g. “Is Sam friendly?” look for confirm. evidence, “Is Sam unfriendly? also look to confirm — S1 favors uncritical acceptance of suggest’ns, exagg’n of probability of extreme, improb. events — e.g. “Probability tsunami will hit California within next 30 years?” mental images of tsunami à overestimate probability

Exaggerated Emotional Coherence (Halo Effect)

  • halo effect, common bias = tendency to like/dislike everything about a person, incl. things not observed — S1 generates rep’n of world simpler, more coherent than reality
  • e. g. meet X, like her, will attrib. other good qualities to her
  • sequence is impt., halo effect puts extra wgt. on first impressions  — e.g. teacher marking 2 essays by a student —
e.g. What do you think of Alan and Ben?
Alan: intelligent — industrious — impulsive — critical— stubborn — envious
Ben: envious — stubborn — critical — impulsive — industrious — intelligent
Alan preferred, first words colour others, ambig’ty of ‘stubborn,’ intellig. = dangerous?
  • to counter the halo effect, decorrelate errors, i.e. use multiple independent sources — e.g. before discussion, everyone writes opinion

What You See is All There is (WYSIATI)

  • S1 constructs story but only w. ideas currently activated, no allowance for other data — S1 is “successful,” satisfied when story is coherent, not care abt. amt. & quality of data, will jump to concl’ns
  • e.g. “Will X be a good leader? She is intelligent and strong…,” S1 immediately says Yes, but X may be corrupt, cruel
  • coherence-seeking S1 + lazy S2 à S2 accepts S1’s first impressions — S2 can think carefully, but always influenced by S1 — S1’s input never ceases
  • jumping to concl’ns on basis of limited evidence is impt. to underst. of intuitive thinking
  • aN.B. WYSIATI = what you see is all there is
  • WYSIATI  helps S1 achieve coherence, cogn. ease, helps think fast, make sense of complex input, usually efficient
·         but WYSIATI has many biases —
o   overconfidence
o   framing effects — how info is presented — e.g. 90% fat-free vs. 10% fat
o   base-rate neglect — e.g. X is meek and tidy à more likely be librarian than farmer, forgetting statistical probabilities

Speaking of Jumping to Conclusions

·          “She knows nothing about this person’s management skills. All she is going by is the halo effect fr. a good presentation.”
·         “Let’s decorrelate errors by obtaining separate judg’ts on the issue before any discussion. We will get more information fr. independent assess’ts.”
·         “They made that big decision on the basis of a good report from one consultant. WYSIATI—what you see is all there is. They did not seem to realize how little information they had.”

·         “They didn’t want more information that might spoil their story. WYSIATI.”

08 - Chapter 8: How Judgments Happen

Chapter 8: How Judgments Happen


  • S1 can substitute one judg’t for another
    • (1) S1 contin’ly monitors exsternal & internal worlds, contin’ly generates assessments,  w. no specific intention, w. little or no effort — these basic assess’ts are easily subst’d for more difficult questions, play impt. role in intuitive judg’t — this is the essential idea of the heuristics and biases approach
    • (2) S1 translates values across dimensions, e.g. “If Sam were as tall as he is intelligent, how tall would he be?”
    • (3) mental shotgun, S2 may want specific answ. but auto’ly trigger other computations, incl. basic assess’ts

Basic Assessments

  • S1 contin’ly assesses for survival threats: How are things? Threat, major opportunity? Normal? Shd I approach/ avoid? — good/bad, escape/approach 
  • assess’ts of safety & familiarity à good mood, cognitive ease
  • e.g. friend or foe, detect shape of face (shape of chin), smile/frown — assess’t of politicians
  • S1 can make many assess’ts, but not all — e.g.
     S1 sees towers are same hgt., towers more similar to each other than to middle blocks, but not see that no. of blocks is equal (S2 can determine that)
  •  
      S1 see avg. length of lines, also colour, that not parallel — S1 can also form an immed. impression of no. of objts, precisely if
    4 or fewer, crudely if more — but S1 does not know total length of lines (S2 can calculate) — S1 rep’s categories by a prototype or set of typical exemplars, so it is good w. averages, poor w. totals
  • e.g. asked how much you are willing to pay to save birds fr. oil ponds, 2,000 birds, 20,000, 200,000, answers almost same, were responding to prototype, mental image of bird, emotional context, no quantity

Intensity Matching

  • intensity (i.e. more of some quantity) — S1 allows matching intensity in several dimensions, transl. betw. diff. scales — e.g. crimes as colors, murder a deeper red than theft — S1 can answ. “Julie read fluently when she was four years old. How tall is a man who is as tall as Julie was precocious?”

The Mental Shotgun

·         the mental shotgun — S1 constantly generates data, when S2 requests one datum, S1 can report multiple
  • e.g.  middle sent. more obviously wrong, slower to see the error in first & last because true as metaphor, S1 sees that, hence slower to recog. the falsehood of the state’t
  • N.B. mental shotgun + intensity matching = we have intuitive judg’ts about many things that we know little about (see next chapter)

Speaking of Judgment

·         “Evaluating people as attractive or not is a basic assessment. You do that automatically whether or not you want to, and it influences you.”
·         “There are circuits in the brain that evaluate dominance from the shape of the face. He looks the part for a leadership role.”
·         “The punishment won’t feel just unless its intensity matches the crime. Just as you can match the loudness of a sound to the brightness of a light.”

·         “This was a clear instance of a mental shotgun. He was asked whether he thought the company was financially sound, but he couldn’t forget that he likes their product.”