99 - Conclusions and Summary

Conclusions

• ·         two characters = S1, S2
• ·         two species = Econs, Humans
• ·         two selves = experiencing self, remembering self

Two selves

• ·         people make mistaken choices for themselves — e.g. cold hand exp’t — choose unneces. pain ß peak-end rule, duration neglect — rememb. self chooses the exper. that leaces best memory, not least pain — e.g. eval opera or a life by last moments
• ·         rememb. self is constucuted by S2 but memory has S1 features (p.end rule, d.neglect) — rememb. self ignores time — poor eval’n of the past — poor guide for decisions, prefer short per’s of intense joy over long per of moderate happiness — also, fear short per of intense but tolerable suffering over longer of moderate pain — accept long per of mild unpleasantness if good ending, reject long per of happiness if ends badly
• ·         rememb. self à distorted relfection of actual experience
• ·         in contrast, duration-weighted conception of well-being — all moments are weighed, altho extra weightings for some (e.g. memorable, impt) — if we dwell on memorable moment, include that time in its duration, thus in its weighting — traumatic event is weighted for consequent misery
• ·         but duration weighting is not sufficient for theory of well-being — we identify w our rembmerb. self, care abt story
• ·         theory of well-being shd incl both rememb. self + exper. self
• ·         policy issues — investments in medical care for e.g. blindness, based on actual exper’d suffering or intensity of desire to be relieved?
• ·         measures of well-being now being considered as guide to gov’t policy

Econs and Humans

• ·         in economics people (Econs) are rational — but Humans have all the cognitive,  etc. biases
• ·         humans not irrational, only not well desc’d by the rational agent model
• ·         humans need help to make more accurate judg’ts and better decisions — institutionns & policies can help
• ·         behavioral economists
• ·         vs. Chicago School of econ., libertarian — people (Econs) are rational, free, respons for their own choices (e.g. not save for old age, not wear helmet, always read all the fine print ) — govt’t shd not interfere
• ·         libertarian paternalism — Nudge (2008) by Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein — try retain freedome while offering protection agst human mistakes (S1 errors, S2 laziness)

Two Systems

• ·         S1, S2
• ·         we think we are S2, attentive — S2 articulates decisions & choices, but often merely endorsing S1
• ·         skills ß regular environ’t w. rapid & unequivocal feedback, opport. to practice — judgt’s then are rapid & mostly accurate, automatic, fast (i.e. S1)
• ·         S1 rarely refuses an answ. — to answ X, generates multiple answ’s, may substitute — substitute is given because it comes most readily to mind (not necess’ly simpler), may be approx  correct, may be wrong
• ·         S1 gives no warning when its answ is unreliable — S2 cannot easily disting. betw skilled & heuristic answ, S2 wd hv to pause, generate its own answer, but S2 is lazy 
• ·         S1 is source of errors & biases — features (e.g. WYSIATI, intensity matching, associative coherence) à predictable biases & cognitive illusions (e.g. anchoring, nonregressive predict’ns, overconfidence, more)
• ·         how to avoid biases — whether indiv’ly or in organiz’ns — req’s great effort — S1 cannnot be trained — can learn to recog situations prone to certain errors (easier to see errors in others than in self) — pause, call upon S2
• ·         organiz’ns can avoid errors easier than indiv’ls — slower, orderly procedures — e.g. checklists,  reference-class forecasting , premortem, vocab. (e.g. as “anchoring effects,” “narrow framing,” “excessive coherence”)